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Abstract
We use a novel dataset and research design to empirically detect the eﬀect
of social interactions among neighbors on labor market outcomes. Speciﬁcally,
using Census data that characterize residential and employment locations down
to the city block, we examine whether individuals residing in the same block are
more likely to work together than individuals in nearby but not identical blocks.
We ﬁnd signiﬁcant evidence of social interactions: the baseline probability of
working together is 0.93% at the block level compared to 0.51% at the block
group level (a collection of ten contiguous blocks). We also provide evidence
as to which types of matches between individuals result in greater levels of
referrals. These ﬁndings are robust to the introduction of detailed controls for
socio-demographic characteristics and block group ﬁxed eﬀects, as well as across
various speciﬁcations intended to address sorting and housing market rather
than labor market referrals. Further, our estimated eﬀects have a signiﬁcant
impact on a wide range of labor market outcomes more generally.
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11 Introduction
The relevance of social networks and local interactions for economic outcomes has
been increasingly recognized by economists in a variety of contexts. Some recent ex-
amples include crime (Glaeser et al. (1996)); welfare program participation (Bertrand
et al. (2000)); the diﬀusion of new technologies (Conley and Udry (2003), Bandiera
and Rasul (2003)); peer eﬀects in education (Sacerdote (2001), Zimmerman (2003),
Zax and Rees (2002)); neighborhood eﬀects (Case and Katz (1991), Aaronson (1998),
Weinberg et al. (forthcoming)); knowledge spillovers and economies of agglomeration
(Jaﬀe et al. (1993), Audretsch and Feldman (1996), Glaeser et al. (1992)).1
More speciﬁcally with respect to labor market activities, a growing literature both
in sociology and economics has documented the widespread use of social networks in
job search.2 An early study of the Chicago labor market by Rees and Schultz (1970)
ﬁnds that informal sources such as referrals from current employees accounts for about
half of all white collar hires and for about four ﬁfths of blue collar hires. Granovetter
(1995) ﬁnds that roughly 56% of all new jobs are found through neighbors, friends,
relatives, or business acquaintances. Corcoran et al. (1980) conﬁrm this basic ﬁnding
and report, in addition, that informal hiring channels are more prevalent among black
workers, as well as younger and less educated workers.3
A related literature has studied the role of social interactions at the local level
by exploiting the (quasi)-experimental nature of several programs aimed at residents
of low-income urban neighborhoods. In Chicago in the late 1970’s, the Gautreaux
Program — as part of a court-imposed public housing de-segregation eﬀort — gave
housing vouchers to eligible black families in public housing to move to white or
racially mixed neighborhoods. Popkin et al. (1993) ﬁnd notable improvements in
labor outcomes resulting from the relocation. More recently, the Moving To Oppor-
tunity demonstration (MTO) is a randomized experiment that gave Section 8 housing
vouchers that allowed participants to move from high-poverty neighborhoods in ﬁve
U.S. cities. Katz et al. (2001), using data from the Boston site, report improved
health outcomes for adults and children, but no signiﬁcant eﬀects of the program on
employment, earnings and welfare receipt of household heads; Ludwig et al. (2001)
study the Baltimore site and ﬁnd a signiﬁcant reduction in juvenile crime following
the relocation.4
1For a more extensive review of the literature, both theoretical and empirical, see Brock and
Durlauf (2001) or Conley and Topa (2003).
2The use of informal methods in job search can be rationalized as a means to reduce the two-sided
uncertainty regarding the quality of a prospective employer-employee match. Montgomery (1991)
models the employer’s side of the problem. Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (forthcoming) explicitly
model the information exchange process within workers’ networks.
3More recently, Addison and Portugal (2001) study data from Portugal and ﬁnd that roughly
half of their respondents found their current jobs using informal methods; Wahba and Zenou (2003)
report a very similar incidence of informal search method by the unemployed using Egyptian data.
4Other research has used randomized experiments to look for evidence of social interactions in
various settings: see Sacerdote (2001), Duﬂo and Saez (2003), Palacios-Huerta (2003).
2In this paper, we follow a novel route to detect the eﬀect of social interactions
among neighbors on labor market outcomes, building on these previous studies in
several ways.5 First, with respect to the literature on informal hiring channels, we
add the neighborhood dimension to the study of referrals in job search, thereby con-
tributing to the debate on whether residential location aﬀects access to opportunities.
Further, in addition to just detecting the use of informal search methods, we provide
evidence on the ultimate incidence of these methods on labor market outcomes, such
as labor force participation, employment, hours worked and earnings.6 The paper
also builds on the neighborhood eﬀects literature by providing a detailed analysis of
as p e c i ﬁc channel through which interactions at the neighborhood level may oper-
ate. A limitation of the existing literature is that it is necessarily agnostic as to the
actual mechanisms linking neighborhoods to individual outcomes: a cursory list of
potential mechanisms includes information exchanges about jobs, preference interde-
pendence and social norms, neighborhood-wide enforcement, congestion eﬀects and
complementarities, environmental quality, school quality — to name but a few.
The basic idea of our paper is to examine whether individuals residing in the
same neighborhood (to be deﬁned more precisely later) are characterized by undue
clustering of their work locations, suggesting the presence of local social interactions.7
Suppose for the moment that space is continuous and homogeneous. A number of
standard models would predict that the place of work of residents at a given location
would be uniformly distributed along any given circle drawn around that residential
location. On the other hand, suppose that unemployed workers use informal hiring
channels in their job search, such as referrals from current employees at a given ﬁrm,
and that agents interact more frequently with social contacts who reside physically
close. Then the work locations of residents of a particular area will be no longer
uniformly distributed around that neighborhood, but rather they will be tend to be
geographically clustered. Thus a simple test for the presence of informal local hiring
channels is to see whether agents who live close to each other also tend to work
together.
Of course, a host of potential problems immediately come to mind. Perhaps the
5Topa (2001) aims at empirically quantifying the magnitude of local spillovers that may be due
to information exchanges about job opportunities using the spatial correlation patterns in urban
unemployment. There, a model is studied in which agents interact locally with their social contacts.
The stationary distribution implied by the model is characterized by positive spatial correlations,
and the model parameters are structurally estimated by matching the empirical spatial distribution
of unemployment in a metropolitan area with the simulated one generated by the model.
6This aspect of the analysis has been largely absent in the existing literature. Notable exceptions
include Holzer (1988) and Datcher Loury (2004). The former uses NLSY data to study the choice
of search method in a sample of unemployed young males, and ﬁnds that informal referrals are the
most productive method in terms of job oﬀer and acceptance probabilities. The latter studies the
impact of informal referrals on earnings.
7Ellison and Glaeser (1997) also consider spatial concentration as a potential indicator of local
spillovers: they develop an index of geographic concentration of economic activity that is not sensitive
to the speciﬁc source of agglomeration, and is easily comparable across industries.
3most critical issue is how to distinguish this social interactions hypothesis from other
possible factors that may make it more likely for individuals who reside near each
other to also work close to one another. For example, agents residing in the same
geographic area have very similar access to transportation routes and ﬁrm clusters.
Further, diﬀerent socio-demographic groups may be diﬀerentially attracted to ex-
isting neighborhoods, industrial areas or transportation nodes. Finally, agents who
relocated to newly-developed neighborhoods roughly at the same time may have a
relatively high propensity to ﬁnd work in speciﬁc ﬁrm clusters where employment
growth was occurring at that time. The number and scope of potentially unob-
servable determinants of clustering appears quite daunting, and any analysis that
addressed these concerns by simply including observable covariates would leave open
the strong possibility that any clustering was driven by unobservables rather than
social interactions.
Therefore, we follow an identiﬁcation strategy that relies on the use of diﬀerent
geographic scales to distinguish these possible eﬀects. First, as a baseline, we compute
the probability that two individuals who live in the same Census block group work
in the same location (a Census block). This probability should incorporate all the
observed and unobserved factors that induce undue correlation in the work-residence
segments, including the sorting of individuals into locations. We also include a large
set of socio-demographic control variables, to capture the inﬂuence of geography
on speciﬁc groups. Then, we compute the likelihood that two individuals living in
the same Census block work in the same location.8 T ot h ee x t e n tt h a tt h el a t t e r
probability is higher than the former (in a statistically signiﬁcant sense), we conclude
that very local hiring network eﬀects are present.
The identifying assumptions are two-fold: ﬁrst, we assume that no signiﬁcant
sorting occurs below the level of the block group, due perhaps to the thinness of the
housing market. In other words, one may choose her residential location down to the
block group level, but the speciﬁc block is assigned randomly. Second, we assume that
social interactions leading to referrals are very local, and take place within a block.
Of course, to the extent that social interactions occur at a larger geographic scale
than a block, our estimates represent a lower bound of the importance of network
eﬀects in hiring.
After measuring the social interaction eﬀect as the additional propensity for two
residents in the same census block to also work together in the same block (both
unconditionally and conditioning on the pair’s characteristics), we extend the analysis
in several directions. First, we examine alternative speciﬁcations to address the issue
of reverse causation: it is possible that referrals operate in the opposite direction,
namely one’s co-workers may oﬀer information about potential residential locations
to a new hire. We address this possibility by using samples that consider workers who
have resided in the current location at least two years, while one of the individuals in
8A Census block group is partitioned into several blocks. In our sample, a block group is composed
on average of about ten blocks.
4the pair was likely to be looking for work last year. Second, we perform a robustness
analysis of our estimates with respect to the assumption of no additional sorting
at the block level. In particular, we repeat our estimation procedure for several
subsamples that empirically exhibit the least amount of sorting with respect to various
demographic characteristics.
The ﬁnal portion of the paper aims at empirically quantifying the importance
of the estimated referral eﬀects. We do so by including a measure of match qual-
ity (or referral potential) for individual workers into standard regressions for labor
force participation, employment, weeks and hours worked, earnings and wages. We
deﬁne match quality for each individual as the average informational content of that
individual’s matches with other adults residing in the same Census block. We then
study the extent to which a one standard deviation increase in match quality raises
the probability of participating in the labor force, expected weeks or hours worked,
and so on.
Our estimation results indicate that there are signiﬁcant social interaction eﬀects
at the Census block level. In terms of the magnitude of the eﬀect, the baseline prob-
ability of working together at the block group level is about 0.51% on average, but
rises to 0.93% going to the block level. Further, our ﬁndings are robust to the in-
troduction of detailed controls for socio-demographic characteristics and block group
ﬁxed eﬀects, as well as across various speciﬁcations intended to address the possibility
of local sorting within block groups on the one hand, and reverse causation on the
other hand. Finally, our estimated referral eﬀects are found to have a (statistically
and economically) signiﬁcant positive impact on all labor market outcomes under
consideration. For instance, a one standard deviation increase in match quality raises
expected labor force participation by 1.1 percentage points, weeks worked by about
two thirds of one week, and earnings by about two percentage points.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data set from
the Boston metropolitan area. Section 3 contains our estimation methodology both
for the basic network eﬀect in hiring, and for the extensions discussed above. We
report our empirical results in Sections 4. Finally, Section 5 oﬀers some concluding
remarks.
2D a t a
A novel and very fruitful aspect of this paper is that we are able to use the restricted
access version of the Decennial Census, at the Census Research Data Center in Boston.
Essentially, the restricted access version of the Census data contains information on
everyone who ﬁlled out the long form questionnaire of the Census (about a 1-in-
7 sample), and provides information on both residential and employment locations
down to the Census block level. For each individual, we observe age, gender and
marital status, education, race, family structure, tenure in the residential block. We
also observe labor force status, salary and wage income if employed, occupation,
5industry, and other socio-demographic characteristics.9 We are focusing on the Boston
metropolitan area and have access to the 1990 Decennial Census.
For the baseline network eﬀect analysis, we construct a sample that contains all
pairs of currently employed, U.S. born individuals who reside in the same block group
within the Boston metropolitan area, who do not belong to the same household, and
whose age is between 25 and 59.10 Overall, the sample contains about 4 million
observations on pairs, constructed out of roughly 110,000 employed individuals. For
the labor market outcomes analysis, we use a sample of U.S. born, prime age (25 to
59) individuals who live in the Boston metropolitan area. This sample has roughly
150,000 observations.
With regard to the geographic structure of the data, there are 2,565 block groups
in our sample, with an average of 10 blocks each. The distribution of blocks per
block group ranges from one to 54, and is depicted in Figure 1: the median number
of blocks per block group is roughly eight, and about 95% of all block groups have
20 blocks or less. The average number of workers per block is 4.7 (47 workers per
block group). Figure 2 reports the corresponding histogram: the median number of
w o r k e r sp e rb l o c ki sa b o u tt h r e e ,a n d95% of all blocks contain 13 workers or less.
The Census block deﬁnition refers to the physical area (typically roughly rectangular)
delimited by four streets intersecting each other. As such, it excludes buildings that
face each other on the same street. Therefore, to the extent that social interactions
occur between residents on opposite sides of the same street, our estimated network
eﬀect is a lower bound of the “true” eﬀect.11
3 Estimation Strategy
In this Section, we study the empirical question of detecting informal network eﬀects
in job search by analyzing the baseline model for whether pairs of employed indi-
viduals living in the same residential location also work in the same location. The
maintained hypothesis, simply put, is that agents interact very locally with their so-
cial contacts, exchanging information about jobs. In particular, when unemployed, an
individual may receive referrals from her employed contacts about job opportunities
oﬀered by their employers (or available at nearby ﬁrms in the same work location).
9In future work, we plan to use detailed information on language spoken at home, ancestry,
and immigration/citizenship status to focus more precisely on several dimensions along which social
networks are constructed.
10“Currently employed” refers to the reference week in calendar year 1990 used by the Census.
Also, notice that the matching algorithm drops all matches where the second individual’s household
identiﬁcation number is less than or equal to the ﬁrst individual’s number in order to eliminate
duplicate pairs.
11Depending on the speciﬁcn e i g h b o r h o o d ,o n em a ya r g u ei nt h eo p p o s i t ed i r e c t i o n :s t r e e t sm a y
eﬀectively act as dividers of local communities, and interactions may be strongest in the alleys and
courtyards connecting the rear sides of buildings on the same block. This is consistent with our
assumption of ‘within-block’ interactions.
6This pattern of information transmission generates a linkage between the residential
location of a pair of socially connected individuals and their work locations, inducing
clustering in the work-residence segments in our sample. Other things being equal,
such clustering would not arise if agents simply searched for jobs at a cost that is
increasing in the distance from their residential location.
3.1 Baseline Speciﬁcation
The empirical strategy used in our baseline analysis is quite intuitive. As we men-
tioned in Section 1, our objective is to examine the diﬀerence in the propensities to
work at the same location (block) for pairs of individuals who reside in the same
block group and in the same block, respectively. Under the assumption that social
interactions are very local and that no signiﬁcant sorting occurs below the level of
the block group, a test for the statistical signiﬁcance of the diﬀerence between these
propensities would be a test for social interactions in employment locations.
Formally, our baseline speciﬁcation is the following linear probability model:
W
b
ij = ρg + β




ij + εij, (1)
where i and j denote two individuals who reside in the same Census block group but
not in the same household, Wb
ij is a dummy variable that is equal to one if i and
j w o r ki nt h es a m eC e n s u sb l o c k ,Rb
ij is a dummy variable that is equal to one if i
and j reside in the same Census block, Xij is a vector of socio-demographic control
variables for the matched pair (i,j),a n dρg denotes the residential block group ﬁxed
eﬀect — this is our baseline probability of working in the same block for individuals
residing in the same block group. Our test for the presence of social interaction eﬀects
then is simply a test of the statistical signiﬁcance of the estimated
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The estimated coeﬃcients on the cross terms, b α
0
1, allow us to investigate whether
the social interaction eﬀe c ti sw e a k e ro rs t r o n g e rf o rs p e c i ﬁc socio-demographic char-
acteristics of the matched pair. There are two aspects to this: ﬁrst, certain pairs are
more likely to interact because of the assortative matching present in social networks:
for instance, two individuals of similar age, education, race, or with children of sim-
ilar age.13 Second, certain individuals may be more strongly attached to the labor
market and may thus provide better referrals or information on jobs — for example,
college graduates, married males or individuals with children. In this case, matches
between pairs in which one individual is strongly attached to the labor market and
the other generally more likely to need a referral should also lead to an increased
social interaction eﬀect.
12As a preliminary, in Section 4 we also report estimates for a version of (1) without covariates:
Wb
ij = ρg + α0Rb
ij + uij. In this case, testing for the presence of social interactions amounts to
testing the null hypothesis that α0 =0 .
13See Marsden (1987), (1988) for a discussion of the evidence from the General Social Survey on
assortative matching in networks.
7By including the baseline probability of an employment match for individuals
living in the same block group, b ρg, as well as the pair’s covariates in levels, b β
0
Xij,
we are able to control for any observed and unobserved factors that may inﬂuence
the employment locational choices at the block group level. For example, as we
m e n t i o n e di nt h eI n t r o d u c t i o n ,f e a t u r e so f the urban transportation network (both
observed and unobserved) might induce clustering in the segments that connect work
and residential locations. In other words, people who live physically near each other
may have very similar access to transportation networks and/or employment clusters.
Further, worker characteristics (again, both observed — such as race/ethnicity,
education, occupation — and unobserved — religion, cultural traits, etc.) might be
correlated both with their residential locational preferences and with the likelihood
to work in a given location, if ﬁrm locations tend to cluster along these same at-
tributes. For instance, members of certain demographic groups may be more likely
to live together on the one hand, and choose jobs near central transportation nodes
or in speciﬁc industrial clusters: as a result, these groups will be more likely to work
in the same location. This potential problem is directly addressed by the inclusion of
demographic controls in levels, b β
0
Xij. These controls absorb out the general propen-
sity of certain types of individuals who live in the same block group to work together,
allowing the comparable parameters for individuals who reside on the same block,
b α
0
1, to identify the strength of the social interaction for these individuals.
Temporal issues might also complicate the analysis. Suppose current residents of
a given block group all moved in at similar times because the neighborhood was de-
veloped at that time. Since employment and residential changes often move together
(temporally), it is possible that many residents of that neighborhood may have found
jobs in similar locations, i.e. where employment growth was occurring at the time.
This source of bias is addressed in the same way as the ones above: in this case, the
inclusion of level controls for age and tenure in residence are especially noteworthy
because one provides information on when the individual most likely entered the la-
bor market and the other contains controls for when the individual moved to this
particular neighborhood.
An additional source of bias may derive from the fact that block groups are de-
signed to fall within a given population range while blocks are physical blocks, so that
some block groups contain only a handful of very densely populated blocks whereas
others have up to a few dozens low-density blocks. This construction of block groups
creates a correlation between the variable that records whether two matched individ-
uals reside in the same block, Rb
ij, and the population density within the block group.
Density, however, is also likely correlated with access to transportation systems and
employment clusters, and may therefore aﬀect the likelihood that two individuals
work together: hence a potential bias. Again, we are able to avoid this bias by in-
cluding block group ﬁxed eﬀects that capture the across block group diﬀerences in
8the eﬀect of geography on the likelihood that two individuals work together.14 We
also add a speciﬁc control for the population of the particular blocks in which each
member of a given pair resides within the block group, to pick up any local density
eﬀect.
In this way, our empirical strategy aims at isolating the network referral eﬀect from
these other confounding factors, without having to specify a full-blown behavioral
model of residential and employment location decisions. The advantages of this are
two-fold. On the one hand, we do not have to worry about the possibility of correlated
unobservables generating the observed locational patterns. On the other hand, our
strategy is not sensitive to possible misspeciﬁcation of such a choice model.
The downside to such a strategy is that it relies crucially on the premise that social
interactions are likely to occur at the block level, while households are only able to
choose a block group at the time of the location decision, due perhaps to the thinness
of the housing market. The ﬁr s tp a r to ft h ep r e m i s ed o e sn o ts e e mt o of a r - f e t c h e d ,
given that we only require that at least some (not all) social interactions be very
local, and that this is supported by existing sociological and ethnographic evidence.
T h es e c o n dp a r to ft h ep r e m i s em a yb em o r ep r o b l e m a t i c ,i n s o f a ra sh o u s e h o l d sd o
sort down to the block level.
We address this problem by ﬁrst examining block homogeneity within block
groups. We ask whether blocks are substantially more homogeneous that block
groups, where our standard of comparison is based on how much more homogeneous
block groups are, relative to census tracts. Then, we use this information to draw a
subsample of block groups in which blocks exhibit the least amount of sorting, and
re-estimate the baseline model for the restricted sample in order to see if our results
are robust across samples.
An additional way to determine whether sorting at the block level is indeed a
concern is to compare the coeﬃcient estimates for the matched pair’s covariates Xij,
in levels and as interactions with the block dummy Rb




Assuming that the results at the block group level, which are captured by the level
coeﬃcients, are driven primarily by the types of factors that would bias our analysis,
then b β
0
describe the empirical correlations that arise from these biases. If the biases
at the block group level are similar to those at the block level and only the geographic
scale has changed, then one would expect to see a qualitatively similar result at the
block level (namely, in b α
0). This does not seem to be the case in our empirical
analysis.15
14Note that the structure of the analysis is based on a sample of pairs living in the same block
group, so that block group ﬁxed eﬀects are not needed as a way of ensuring that the model is identiﬁed
using only within-block group variation. Instead, as the discussion in this paragraph makes clear,
the inclusion of block group ﬁxed eﬀects allows for heterogeneity across the metropolitan area in the
baseline propensity of individuals residing in the same block group to work together.
15The limitation of this argument should also be clear. When there are several biases that work
in diﬀerent directions, the relative magnitudes of the biases may change as we shift the level of
9A separate confounding issue is the possibility that the estimated social interac-
tion eﬀect may be due to reverse causation: workers could receive tips and referrals
about residential locations from their co-workers at a given ﬁrm. We address this is-
sue in several ways. First, the empirical focus on the diﬀerence between block group
and block level propensities again mitigates this problem because residential referrals
are unlikely to result in people residing in exactly the same block, due to the thinness
of the housing market at the block level. Further, we tackle the reverse causation
problem directly by estimating (1) on a subsample where both respondents in a given
matched pair have lived in that neighborhood for at least two years, but one of them
was not fully employed last year. Unfortunately the Census does not contain any
direct information on job search activity. Therefore, we use the “not fully employed
last year” category as a proxy for the set of individuals who are most likely to have
been actively searching for a job last year.16 We also estimate an intermediate speci-
ﬁcation using the subsample of pairs whose members were both in residence at least
two years, and adding controls for whether one and/or both individuals were fully
employed last year.
Finally, one word about inference. The sampling scheme, which is based on draw-
ing matched pairs of individuals who reside in the same block group, makes it very
diﬃcult to compute appropriate standard errors for our estimates. In particular, the
observations in our sample — pairs of individuals in the same block group — do not
constitute a random sample. In fact, suppose that individuals a and b work in the
same block. Suppose further that individuals b and c work in the same block. Then,
by transitivity, individuals a and c also work in the same block. As a consequence, if
we compute standard errors via the basic OLS formula, we may tend to understate
their size because we are not taking into account this inherent correlation structure
in our data. In practice, however, the OLS standard errors represent a very good
approximation: since only a very small percentage of pairs actually work in the same
block the overall sample is close to an independently distributed sample. Therefore,
we report OLS standard errors in our Tables.17
geography and as a result the sign of the bias might reverse. For example, at the block group level,
most of the results may be driven by individual observable heterogeneity, but at the block level
residential sorting on unobservable might become more important.
16Formally, “not fully employed last year” refers to individuals who worked less than 40 weeks or
less than 30 hours per week last year (i.e., in calendar year 1989).
17We have compared the OLS standard errors to those obtained via the following bootstrap pro-
cedure. We independently draw 400 1-in-20 subsamples with replacement from the original sample
of pairs. We then compute estimates
³
b α0, b α1, b ρg, b β
´
for each subsample, and plot their empirical
distribution. The standard errors are calculated from the variance of this empirical distribution.
The bootstrapped standard errors are very similar to the OLS ones.
103.2 Labor Market Outcomes
Having estimated the extent of the social interaction eﬀect in our baseline speciﬁca-
tion, we then turn to investigating the impact of this network eﬀect on various labor
market outcomes. Since the strength of the social interactions eﬀect may vary with
the type of matches — as indicated by the analysis in the baseline speciﬁcation — we
wish to see whether in fact the quality of matches available in an individual’s block
aﬀects employment, labor force participation, and wage outcomes.
We have two objectives here. First, since we are attempting to detect informal
hiring eﬀects indirectly, we want to study the connection between our estimated eﬀects
and labor outcomes more closely, in order to enhance the plausibility of our social
interactions results. Second, by focusing on outcomes we hope to be able to provide
a better sense of the magnitude of our estimated network eﬀects. As we noted in
the Introduction, most of the existing literature on informal search methods does not
analyze their impact on aggregate labor market outcomes.
For this analysis, the unit of observation is an individual rather than a pair.
For the employment and labor force participation outcomes, the econometric model
is a linear probability model.18 The likelihood of falling into one of these discrete
categories is speciﬁed as a linear function of household, individual, and neighborhood
variables. For all other outcomes, such as weeks worked, hours-per-week worked,
wages and earnings (in logs), we use a simple linear regression.
We then add — for each model speciﬁcation — a ‘network quality’ proxy variable
for each individual, which is constructed by examining that individual’s matches with
other adults in her block, using the coeﬃcient estimates b α1 from the estimation of
(1). Speciﬁcally, the match quality variable for individual i, Qi, is constructed using
a sample of all possible pairings of individual i with other individuals who reside in
the same block and do not belong to the same household. For each pair, a linear
combination Mij of the pair’s covariates is created using the estimated parameters
from the interaction of these variables with Rb
ij in (1): Mij = b α
0
1Xij. Then, Qi is













We would expect individuals with good matches in their block — high value of Qi
— to have better labor force outcomes on average, after controlling for the direct eﬀect
of their attributes, the average attributes of their block, and block group ﬁxed eﬀects.
W er e p e a tt h ea n a l y s i sf o re a c ho ft h ev a r i o u ss p e c i ﬁcations described in Section 3.1 to
address the sorting and reverse causation issues. In particular, by using a subsample
18We have also performed our analysis using a multinomial logit speciﬁcation, with three discrete
outcomes: out of the labor force, unemployed, and employed. The results are qualitatively very
similar.
11of individuals that were not fully employed last year, we focus on the group that was
most likely to have been looking for work in the past year. We expect the eﬀect of Qi
o nl a b o rm a r k e to u t c o m e st ob em o r es t r o n g l yp o s i t i v ei ft h ei n d i v i d u a lw a sw o r k i n g
less than full time in the previous year, because we would be more likely to detect an
actual instance of using one’s referral network during an active job search.
The actual speciﬁcation used is






3Qi + ui, (2)
where θg are standard block group ﬁxed eﬀects, Xi is the vector of individual at-
tributes that are the same set of attributes used in the workplace clustering speciﬁ-
cation, and Xi is the vector of block averages on the same attributes. The latter are
included in order to control for overall or non-individual speciﬁce ﬀects of neighbor-
hood on employment.
In principle, this model is identiﬁed with block ﬁxed eﬀects because Qi varies
across individuals in a block. In our opinion, however, it would not be appropriate to
include block ﬁxed eﬀects in this model. The current speciﬁcation with block group
ﬁxed eﬀe c t si si d e n t i ﬁed because similar individuals reside in diﬀerent blocks within
t h es a m eb l o c kg r o u pa n dt h e r e f o r eh a v ed i ﬀerent match quality. In other words,
the conceptual experiment considered is to change the match quality for a generic
individual with observables Xi by moving them from one block to another block in
the same block group, which we believe is the appropriate comparison or exercise.
As p e c i ﬁcation that included block ﬁxed eﬀects would be identiﬁed by a comparison
of individuals with diﬀerent match quality in the same block, but individuals with
the same Xi have exactly the same Qi if they are in the same block. Therefore,
the associated, and in our opinion undesirable, conceptual experiment would involve
changes in an individual’s observable attributes and conditioning out of the direct
eﬀect of that change in observable attributes in order to measure the eﬀect of a
change in their match quality. Clearly, the results of the second exercise are likely to
be very sensitive to parametric assumptions concerning how Xi enters labor market
outcomes and are unlikely to provide reliable insights into the magnitude of our social
interaction eﬀects.
Finally, it is important to point out a limitation of this exercise. In particular,
what is actually identiﬁed by the ﬁrst-stage analysis are types of pairs that are more
likely to work together due to the strength of the referral eﬀect between the pair. As
discussed above, we expect this eﬀect to be large in two cases: (i) when a pair is more
likely to interact within their residential neighborhood and (ii) when one person is well
attached to the labor market and the other likely to need a referral. In this way, for
a person that is not well attached to the labor market, the measure of match quality
described here should do a good job of characterizing the quality of matches in a
neighborhood. For a person better attached to the labor market, however, our match
quality variable may actually measure neighborhoods in which such a person provides
rather than receives referrals. In this way, to the extent that our estimated social
12interaction eﬀects in the ﬁrst stage of our analysis are driven by the asymmetry in
labor market attachment rather than by the strength of neighborhood interactions,
our analysis of the eﬀect of match quality on labor market outcomes is likely to
understate the beneﬁts of improved matches.
4 Empirical Results
In this Section we ﬁrst present some summary statistics for our data. We then report
the estimation results for our baseline speciﬁcation and for its various extensions.
Finally, we discuss the labor market outcome regressions.
Table 1 contains summary statistics for our matched pairs sample. The second
column contains the mnemonic code for the category. The third column reports
the relative frequency of each type of pairs in the sample: less than ten percent of
all pairs involves at least one high school dropout; most pairs (94%)a r ea l lW h i t e ;
roughly three quarters have at least one member with children; only about 15%
involve individuals that are single. The fourth column reports — for each category —
the empirical frequency of working in the same block: by construction, this represents
an estimate of the probability of working together for pairs whose members live in
the same block group. It should be noted that the sample contains only a small
fraction of native born Asians and Hispanics and so these two groups are combined.19
The last column reports the same empirical frequency given that both individuals
also live in the same block. The ﬁrst row then indicates that the baseline probability
of working together at the block group level is about 0.51% on average, but rises to
0.93% g o i n gt ot h eb l o c kl e v e l . 20 Almost all groups see an increase in the probability
of working together when we move from the block group to the block. The increases
are especially large, however, for pairs where both are college graduates, both have
children, one individual is white and one is black, both are young, and both are
married females.
Table 2 reports summary statistics for our sample of individuals. As with Table
1, the second column contains a mnemonic code, and the third column contains the
category frequencies. The last four columns contain labor market and commuting
information. College graduates, married males and individuals with children display
the strongest attachment to the labor force, with respect to both employment rates
and weeks worked. These groups also tend to work the farthest away from home,
considering both commuting time and physical distance. One the other hand, high
school dropouts and married females tend to have weak labor force attachment and
work close to home under both commuting metrics.21
19Estimations where these groups are separated yield very similar results.
20The average probability of working together for two individuals who reside in the same block
group but not in the same block is 0.44%.
21Interestingly, Blacks seem to have the shortest commute with respect to physical distance, but
the longest in terms of time. This may reﬂect a higher usage of public transportation for this group.
134.1 Baseline
The ﬁrst two columns of Table 3 contain the estimation results for the baseline spec-
iﬁcation in (1), using our full sample. The ﬁrst row reports the parameter estimate
for α0 in the case with block group ﬁxed eﬀects but without covariates Xij:t h i si s
positive and very statistically signiﬁcant, indicating a strong additional propensity
for two workers living in the same block to also work in the same block, over and
above the estimated propensity for matches in their block group.
Turning now to the full speciﬁcation with covariates, the remaining rows are as-
sembled by groups of variables, such as educational attainment or race/ethnicity of
workers in the pair, where the parameter estimates for the level coeﬃcients are listed
for the entire set of variables followed by the parameter estimates for the variables
when interacted with whether the two workers live on the same block, bmatch. The
estimated social interaction eﬀect is represented by
¡




in equation (1) and
captured by the parameter estimates for the interaction variables. These estimates
are positive and statistically signiﬁcant for most of the socio-demographic categories
in Xij.22 The interaction eﬀects vary by group in interesting ways. With respect to
education, stronger interactions occur for matches where both individuals are high
school graduates or (less so) college graduates. This is consistent with two common
empirical ﬁndings in the existing literature on social networks and on informal hir-
ing channels: ﬁrst, that there is strong assortative matching within social networks
and, second, that informal referrals are more prevalent for relatively less educated
workers.23 The results on race and ethnicity are statistically insigniﬁcant due to
the small number of native born minorities in the Boston metropolitan area, but the
magnitude of the eﬀect of a match between blacks is similar to the eﬀect found for a
match between high school graduates.
We also ﬁnd signiﬁcant referral eﬀects for matches between households with chil-
dren, and especially where both households have pre-school age or teenage children,
and between workers of similar ages. Again, these results seem highly consistent with
the existing empirical consensus on positive sorting in social networks.24 Further, we
ﬁnd very strong interaction eﬀects for all gender and marital status categories relative
to matches between married females. Matches where at least one of the members is a
married male are especially strong, which is consistent with the notion that married
males have a particularly strong attachment to the labor force and therefore may be
better sources of referrals. Finally, social interactions are slightly stronger for smaller
22The negative intercept b α0 in the case with covariates means that the eﬀect is negative (but
barely statistically signiﬁcant) for the left out category: this is for matches between Asians and
Blacks, where one person is a high-school graduate and the other is a college graduate, and one
person is 25 years old while the other is 35, etc. Such a category is a very tiny portion of all pairs
in the sample.
23See, for example, Corcoran et al. (1980).
24Also, older workers tend to experience larger referral eﬀe c t s :t h i si sc o n s i s t e n tw i t ht h ee m p i r i c a l
evidence reported in Granovetter (1995).
14blocks: this is encouraging since such areas typically have fewer housing units and
represent thinner housing markets — hence with less scope for sorting within block
groups.25
Finally, there seem to be striking diﬀerences between the level and the interaction
coeﬃcients associated with the Xij covariates. For example, pairs of married females
are the most likely to work in the same block (perhaps because they tend to work
close to home), but also have the weakest referral eﬀects among all gender and marital
status categories, which is consistent with their relatively low labor force attachment.
Similarly, high school dropouts are more likely to work together, but do not exhibit
stronger referral eﬀects than other education categories. These diﬀerences between
the estimated b α and b β coeﬃcients are reassuring in light of our discussion with regard
to sorting in Section 3.1.
The second block of columns in Table 3 reports estimation results for the subsam-
ple of matches between individuals who have lived in that block group for at least two
years and includes controls for whether either of the workers were not fully employed
last year. The results are qualitatively similar to those in the baseline regression with
the exception of the gender/marital status and the race/ethnicity categories. For
this sample, the married female eﬀect is not robust possibly because the controls for
full employment last year successfully capture the labor force attachment diﬀerences
between married women and other workers. In terms of racial/ethnic groupings, the
interactions are particularly strong for matches in which at least one member is white
where the omitted category is a match between individuals belonging to the Hispanic
or Asian group. Again, this is consistent with a referral interpretation, since whites
tend to be in the labor force more consistently than other groups and can therefore
be expected to provide referrals on a more regular basis.
The key result in this speciﬁcation, however, is that social interactions are stronger
for matches in which one of the individuals was not fully employed the previous year
while the other individual was, whereas interaction eﬀects are dramatically weakened
when both members of the pair were not fully employed the previous year. This is
entirely consistent with our job referral hypothesis, as one would expect referral eﬀects
to be the most prominent for the former type of matches, and the least important for
the latter. In addition, since these are workers who have resided in the same location
for at least two years, these ﬁndings do not lend support to the reverse causation
hypothesis (co-workers giving referrals about desirable residential locations to new
employees).
The last set of columns in Table 3 focuses on the subsample of pairs with both
individuals in residence at least two years, but with only one member fully employed
in the previous year. Again, this sampling scheme reduces the possibility of reverse
causation, since we are considering workers who are more likely to have made a
transition to full employment during the past year and whose residential tenure is
25Alternatively, one could think that social interactions are weaker in larger blocks because it is
more diﬃcult to establish and maintain a social contact in such a block.
15longer than two years. At the same time, by looking at pairs in which one was fully
employed while the other was not, we are focusing on instances in which it is most
likely that a referral or information exchange actually took place.
As in the other speciﬁcations, the estimated social interaction eﬀect is strongly
positive and statistically signiﬁcant for the version without covariates: if anything,
t h es i z eo ft h ee s t i m a t e db α0 is about 50% larger than using the full sample (0.0039 vs.
0.0024). When we introduce covariates, the estimation results become statistically
weaker than in the larger samples, due in part to the smaller sample size. Quali-
tatively, however, our previous results are conﬁrmed, especially with respect to the
fertility and age characteristics of the match. Overall, these ﬁndings strongly support
the job referral hypothesis and make the reverse causation argument unlikely.
4.2 Sorting within Block Groups
Our identiﬁcation strategy relies on the assumption that while households are able to
choose their residential locations, they cannot choose the speciﬁc block of residence.
In other words, there may be sorting across block groups, but not much additional
sorting within them. Here we wish to investigate this issue empirically, by study-
ing the extent of assortative matching along various observable socio-demographic
attributes.
In particular, for a speciﬁcc h a r a c t e r i s t i c( e . g . ,e d u c a t i o n ) ,w ec a l c u l a t et h ea v e r -
age exposure rate of a high school dropout to all education sub-categories, at three
diﬀerent levels of geography: the census tract, the block group, and the block. The
goal is to see whether there is signiﬁcant additional sorting going from the block
group to the single block, relative to the sorting that occurs going from the census
tract to the block group.
This analysis is reported in Table 4. The main result is that there seems to be
some (but not strikingly so) additional sorting on the basis of education, race, and
age. For example, on average a Black individual lives in a tract that is 43% Black;
this percentage rises to 46% at the block group level, and rises further to 53% at
the block level.26 On the other hand, there is clearly strong additional sorting at the
block level with respect to the presence and age of children. This is perhaps due to
the locational choices induced by a desired proximity to schools.
Since we do observe some additional sorting at the block level, we then re-estimate
our baseline speciﬁcation using a subsample of matches drawn from blocks where the
l e a s ta m o u n to fa d d i t i o n a ls o r t i n gt a k e sp l a c e( i . e . ,b l o c k sb e l o wt h em e d i a na m o u n to f
additional sorting with respect to a speciﬁc attribute). The results of this estimation,
for diﬀerent samples based on education, race, and presence of children, are collected
in Table 5.
26Note that there are many more blocks in the average block group than block groups in the
average tract.
16The main ﬁndings of our baseline speciﬁcation (Table 3, columns 1-2) are con-
ﬁrmed and, in some cases, strengthened. Most socio-demographic categories experi-
ence positive and statistically signiﬁcant referral eﬀects. The results for age, presence
of children, and gender/marital status are very similar qualitatively to our baseline.
The education results conﬁrm that the education categories involving matches be-
tween individuals with the same educational attainment (especially for High School
graduates) are characterized by stronger social interactions. The presence of children
especially of pre-school or high school age lead to stronger social interactions, and for
age strong beneﬁts from social interactions primarily arise between individuals who
are both similar in age (thus likely to interact) and older (thus likely to provide refer-
rals). Finally, the eﬀects for race are strengthened suﬃciently to rise to the level of
statistical signiﬁcance. Speciﬁcally, after controlling for sorting attributable to race
or educational attainment, pairs containing two blacks or at least one white worker
exhibit considerably larger positive eﬀects of social interactions than the omitted
category that includes matches between workers in the Hispanic or Asian group.
In sum, it seems that our estimated social interaction eﬀects persist, even in areas
that do not experience a signiﬁcant degree of sorting below the block group level —
at least along observable characteristics. We believe that this set of results further
validates our attempt to isolate referral eﬀects from sorting via the identiﬁcation
strategy proposed in this paper.
4.3 Labor Market Outcome Regressions
In this Section, we wish to look more closely at the economic signiﬁcance of the referral
eﬀects reported above by examining the impact of match quality on various labor
force outcomes. In particular, we perform a set of standard labor force participation,
employment and wage regressions that include a full set of controls for individual
characteristics, average characteristics of the corresponding Census block, and block
group ﬁxed eﬀects. These regressions are augmented to include a match quality
variable Qi constructed using the estimated social interaction eﬀects from the various
speciﬁcations in Section 4.1.
Table 6, columns 1-3 collects our estimation results for the case in which the full
sample of individuals is used, and Qi is constructed with the estimated b α1 from (1)
using the full sample of pairs (Table 3, columns 1-2). For each dependent variable,
we only report the coeﬃcient estimates associated with match quality for the sake
of expositional clarity.27,28 The main result is that our match quality proxy has a
positive and very signiﬁcant impact on all dependent variables under consideration
except employment conditional on labor force participation. For example, a one stan-
27The estimation results for the full sets of individual and block-level covariates are quite standard
and are available from the authors upon request.
28The ﬁrst three dependent variables refer to labor market outcomes for the week preceding the
census survey. The last four variables represent labor market outcomes for the preceding year.
17dard deviation increase in match quality raises labor force participation by about 1.1
percentage points, weeks worked by two thirds of a week, earnings by two percentage
points and wages by 1.4 percentage points. Therefore, our estimated referral eﬀects do
seem to be associated with improved labor market outcomes especially as it concerns
participation in the labor market and the intensity of that participation.29
Columns 4-6 in Table 6 report estimates for the same set of regressions performed
on the subsample of individuals who were in residence in their current block for at least
t w oy e a r s( a g a i nu s i n gt h eb α1 estimates from the corresponding regression in Table
3, columns 3-4). The same pattern of results holds here, although the magnitude of
the eﬀects is onr third to one half weaker than for the full sample. Interestingly, the
estimated coeﬃcient for Qi in the wage regression becomes statistically insigniﬁcant
in this speciﬁcation.30
We take a more detailed look at the eﬀect of match quality on labor market
outcomes in Table 7. The objective here is to focus on individuals who were more
likely to be searching for a job and thus more likely to receive, rather than provide,
referrals. In columns 1-5, we report estimates for the same set of regressions performed
in the second panel of Table 6 (using the subsample of individuals that were both in
residence at least two years), but adding a dummy variable for whether the individual
was not fully employed last year. We then report the coeﬃcient estimates both for
our measure of match quality and for the interaction term of match quality with
the ‘not-fully-employed’ dummy. The results are quite striking: match quality per
se does not have a signiﬁcant impact on any outcome for the individuals who were
fully employed last year, whereas it has strongly positive and signiﬁcant eﬀects for
the individuals who were not fully employed, and thus more likely to beneﬁtf r o m
referrals. The economic magnitude of the eﬀect is larger than in the full sample case
for labor force participation (1.3 rather than 1.1 percentage points), and is very large
(2.4 percentage points) for employment conditional on labor force participation.
The second set of results in Table 7 (columns 6-8) takes a slightly diﬀerent ap-
proach by focusing on the subsample of workers who were in residence for at least
two years and, further, who were not fully employed last year (using the estimated
b α1 coeﬃcients from the corresponding regression in Table 3, columns 5-6). Again, we
would expect match quality to be especially important for this subset of workers. We
ﬁnd that match quality has a slightly larger eﬀect on labor force participation than
in the full sample case. However, the statistical signiﬁcance of this result is weakened
29Recall from our discussion above that this analysis will tend to understate the beneﬁts of im-
proved match quality at the block level as the quality of local matches will typically be overstated
for individuals who generally provide referrals. Also, note that since Qi contains measurement error,
there is likely to be some attenuation bias in our estimates.
30The empirical literature on informal hiring channels contains mixed evidence on the earnings
eﬀect of job networks. Datcher Loury (2004) reports that, in aggregate, informal channels do not
seem to lead to higher earnings than formal ones: however, speciﬁc types of referrals (e.g., from
older male relatives) do generate signiﬁcantly higher earnings. Marmaros and Sacerdote (2002) also
report a positive association between earnings and informal contacts.
18because of the reduced sample size.31
Finally, Table 8 reports the impact of match quality on the same set of labor
market outcomes as in Table 6, for the subsamples of matches drawn from blocks
in which the least amount of sorting takes place. Again, for each speciﬁcation the
estimated b α1 are used from the corresponding regressions reported in Table 5. The
results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the ones obtained using the full
sample, conﬁrming the robustness of our analysis to the potential issues induced by
sorting.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper aims at detecting the presence of informal referral eﬀects in the labor
market by using a novel data set and identiﬁcation strategy. We ﬁnd signiﬁcant
evidence of social interaction eﬀects at the block level. The baseline probability of
working together at the block group level is about 0.51% on average, but rises to 0.93%
going to the block level. These ﬁndings are robust to the introduction of detailed
controls for socio-demographic characteristics and block group ﬁxed eﬀects, as well
as across various speciﬁcations intended to address biases caused by sorting below
the block level and housing market referrals exchanged between people who work
together. Furthermore, the relationship between socio-demographic characteristics
and the strength of social interactions make sense. Social interactions tend to be
stronger when the match involves individuals who are likely to interact because they
are similar in terms of education, age, and presence of children. Interactions also
appear to be stronger when they involve at least one type of individual who is strongly
attached to the labor market leading to weaker interactions when both members of
the pair are high school drop-outs, young, or married females.
Furthermore, our estimated referral eﬀects have a positive impact on labor mar-
ket outcomes. Even after controlling for individual attributes, observable block at-
tributes, and unobservable block group attributes using ﬁxed eﬀects, an individual’s
match quality is a statistically signiﬁcant determinant of most labor market outcomes
considered across all of our speciﬁcations. In terms of economic magnitude, a one
standard deviation increase in referral opportunities raises expected labor force par-
ticipation by one percentage point, weeks worked by about two thirds of one week,
and earnings by about two percentage points.
This paper provides a new approach for examining the eﬀect of social interactions
based on variation in geographic scale, and this approach might be useful in a variety
of contexts. For example, in the case of welfare participation, the block of residence
is unlikely to greatly inﬂuence access to public service providers after controlling for
the block group, and in the case of intellectual spillovers it seems unlikely that a ﬁrm’s
access to local suppliers or the regional labor market (the other two major sources of
31The p-value is roughly 0.12 for a two-sided test of the null hypothesis that the parameter is zero.
19agglomeration economies) would vary much within individual block groups. In future
work on social interactions on employment, we plan to extend this analysis to two
groups of individuals for whom we expect informal hiring networks to be especially
important: namely, young adults and recent immigrants.
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236 Appendix
The following are the deﬁnitions of the variables used in the empirical exercise.
bmatch: dummy variable equal to one if both members of the pair reside in the
same Census block, zero otherwise.
Education
hsd_hsd: dummy variable equal to one if both members of the pair are high school
dropouts, zero otherwise.
hsg_hsg: dummy variable equal to one if both members of the pair are high school
graduates, zero otherwise.
clg_clg: dummy variable equal to one if both members of the pair are college
graduates, zero otherwise.
Race
wht_wht: dummy variable equal to one if both members of the pair are White,
zero otherwise.
bl_bl: dummy variable equal to one if both members of the pair are Black, zero
otherwise.
bl_wht: dummy variable equal to one if one member of the pair is Black and the
other is White, zero otherwise.
ashi_wht: dummy variable equal to one if one member of the pair is Asian or
Hispanic and the other is White, zero otherwise.
Fertility
child_m: dummy variable equal to one if both members of the pair have children,
zero otherwise.
c05_05: dummy variable equal to one if both members of the pair have children
between 0 and 5 years of age, zero otherwise.
c612_612: dummy variable equal to one if both members of the pair have children
between 6 and 12 years of age, zero otherwise.
c1317_1317: dummy variable equal to one if both members of the pair have
children between 13 and 17 years of age, zero otherwise.
c1824_1824: dummy variable equal to one if both members of the pair have
children between 18 and 24 years of age, zero otherwise.
Age
a25_25: dummy variable equal to one if both members of the pair are between
25 and 34 years of age, zero otherwise.
a35_35: dummy variable equal to one if both members of the pair are between
35 and 44 years of age, zero otherwise.
a45_45: dummy variable equal to one if both members of the pair are between
45 and 59 years of age, zero otherwise.
24a35_45: dummy variable equal to one if one member of the pair is 35 − 44 and
the other is 45 − 59 years of age, zero otherwise.
Gender and Marital Status
sm_sm: dummy variable equal to one if both members of the pair are single
males, zero otherwise.
sf_sf: dummy variable equal to one if both members of the pair are single females,
zero otherwise.
sm_sf: dummy variable equal to one if one member of the pair is a single male
and the other is a single female, zero otherwise.
mm_mm: dummy variable equal to one if both members of the pair are married
males, zero otherwise.
mm_mf: d u m m yv a r i a b l ee q u a lt oo n ei fo n em e m b e ro ft h ep a i ri sam a r r i e d
male and the other is a married female, zero otherwise.
sm_mf: dummy variable equal to one if one member of the pair is a single male
and the other is a married female, zero otherwise.
sm_mm: dummy variable equal to one if one member of the pair is a single male
and the other is a married male, zero otherwise.
sf_mf: dummy variable equal to one if one member of the pair is a single female
and the other is a married female, zero otherwise.
sf_mm: dummy variable equal to one if one member of the pair is a single female
and the other is a married male, zero otherwise.
Tenure in Residence, and Size of Census Block
lngth: the sum of the household times in residence for the two members of the
pair.
lngth_min: the minimum of the household times in residence for the two members
of the pair.
lngth_within 5: dummy variable equal to one if the household times in residence
f o rt h et w om e m b e r so ft h ep a i ra r ew i t h i nﬁve years of each other, zero otherwise.
blocksize: the total population of the Census blocks in which the two members of
the pair reside.
25TABLE 1
Matched Pairs Sample: Summary Statistics
Variable Name Code percentage work together live/ work together
full sample 0.51 0.93
Both high school drop out hsd_hsd 0.38 0.75 0.94
Both high school graduate hsg_hsg 18.63 0.69 1.41
Both college graduate clg_clg 32.36 0.4 0.74
HS drop out - HS grad hsd_hsg 4.68 0.73 1.05
HS drop out – College grad hsd_clg 4.25 0.52 0.77
HS grad – College grad hsg_clg 39.7 0.48 0.89
Both White wht_wht 94.03 0.5 0.86
Both Black bl_bl 0.55 0.63 1.3
White – Black bl_wht 2.81 0.67 2.09
White – Asian/Hispanic ashi_wht 2.38 0.56 1.33
Black  – Asian/Hispanic ashi_bl ? ? ?
Both have children child_m 28.8 0.65 1.58
Both have children age 0-5  c05_05 3.55 0.68 2.64
Both have children age 6-12  c612_612 4.53 0.83 2.28
Both have children age 13-17  c1317_1317 3 0.79 1.76
Both have children age 18-24 c1824_1824 3.28 0.65 0.87
No children nokid_m 25.74 0.41 0.59
Both age  25-34 a25_25 14.22 0.53 1.25
Both age 35-44 a35_35 11.34 0.51 1.01
Both age 45-59 a45_45 9.36 0.56 0.87
Age 25-34 and age 45-59 a25_45 20.14 0.47 0.71
Age 35-44 and age 45-59 a35_45 19.95 0.52 0.86
Age  25-34 and age 35-44 a25_35 23.44 0.48 0.93
Both single male sm_sm 3.22 0.39 0.54
Both single female sf_sf 4.3 0.46 0.66
Single male–single female sm_sf 7.21 0.4 0.49
Both married male mm_mm 13.69 0.44 1.09
Married male–married female mm_mf 21.99 0.53 1.37
Single male-married female sm_mf 8.52 0.53 0.68
Single male-married male sm_mm 10.37 0.41 0.61
Single female-married female sf_mf 9.84 0.55 0.8
Single female-married male sf_mm 11.97 0.38 0.55
Both married female mf_mf 8.9 0.89 2.06TABLE 2
Individual Sample: Summary Statistics
Variable Name Code percentage % employed weeks worked Commute Time Commute Distance
full sample 81.73 47.6 23.9 6.9
high school drop out hsd_p 7.63 60.41 45.4 21.8 5.3
high school graduate hsg_p 42.98 78.51 47.3 22.2 6.5
college graduate clg_p 49.39 87.82 48 25.4 7.5
age  25-34 a25_34_p 37.91 82.2 47.2 24.8 7
age 35-44 a35_44_p 31.82 83.14 47.6 23.8 7.1
age 45-59 a45_59_p 30.27 79.63 48 22.8 6.7
single male sm_p 17.69 82.91 47.3 24 6.4
single female sf_p 20.53 81.99 47.6 24.5 5.9
married male mm_p 30.22 92.13 50 26.4 8.8
married female mf_p 31.56 70.93 45.3 20.3 6
have children c0_0_p 48.97 84.43 48 24.7 6.7
have children age 0-5  c0_5_p 19.25 74.64 46.9 25.4 8.1
have children age 6-12  c6_12_p 19.89 77.27 46.5 22.6 7.3
have children age 13-17  c13_17_p 15.09 82.08 46.9 22.1 6.9
have children age 18-24 c18_24_p 16.76 81.44 47.8 22.3 6.7
White white_p 93.86 82.47 47.7 23.8 7
Black black_p 3.98 72.3 46 27 5.2
Asian/Hispanic ashi_p 2.15 66.67 45.3 24 5.3
lived in block for < 2 years live0 15.03 82.16
lived in block for >= 2 years live2 84.97 81.65
not fully employed nfulle 24.63 38.59 21.5 20.5 5.5
fully employed fulle 75.37 50.9 24.3 7.1
Summary statistics based on individual sample: obs: 151572
for employed, average variables, obs: 110444TABLE 3
coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat
0.0024 22.1000 0.0025 19.4000 0.0039 11.9453
Reside in same block bmatch -0.0036 -1.9448 -0.0034 -1.3395 0.0026 0.5058
Both high school drop out hsd_hsd 0.0028 4.3859 0.0031 4.2075 0.0012 0.7640
Both high school graduate hsg_hsg 0.0013 12.3505 0.0012 9.7509 0.0015 4.7894
Both college graduate clg_clg -0.0003 -3.5072 -0.0004 -3.5617 -0.0006 -2.1440
HS drop out - HS grad hsd_hsg 0.0022 11.8281 0.0023 10.7450 0.0027 5.3064
HS drop out – College grad hsd_clg 0.0006 2.9754 0.0008 3.5382 0.0003 0.4957
bmatch* hsd_hsd 0.0006 0.3445 0.0000 -0.0237 -0.0004 -0.1009
bmatch* hsg_hsg 0.0016 5.3192 0.0009 2.5293 0.0009 1.0225
bmatch* clg_clg 0.0008 3.1667 0.0008 2.7995 0.0013 1.6422
bmatch* hsd_hsg 0.0003 0.5780 0.0002 0.3339 -0.0015 -1.0496
bmatch* hsd_clg 0.0000 -0.0794 0.0002 0.2966 0.0001 0.0873
Both White wht_wht -0.0014 -1.5649 -0.0001 -0.0907 0.0022 0.8276
Both Black bl_bl 0.0014 1.2470 0.0006 0.4039 0.0058 1.8673
White – Black bl_wht -0.0019 -2.0054 -0.0009 -0.7286 0.0014 0.5376
White – Asian/Hispanic ashi_wht -0.0014 -1.5289 -0.0003 -0.2562 0.0015 0.5768
bmatch* wht_wht 0.0012 0.6971 0.0055 2.2670 0.0030 0.6108
bmatch* bl_bl 0.0021 0.9865 0.0031 1.1322 -0.0037 -0.6697
bmatch* bl_wht 0.0010 0.5500 0.0024 0.9444 -0.0008 -0.1659
bmatch* ashi_wht 0.0011 0.6107 0.0047 1.8153 -0.0026 -0.5087
Both have children child_m 0.0008 6.9990 0.0007 5.9924 0.0013 4.4849
Both have children age 0-5  c05_05 -0.0004 -1.6713 -0.0007 -2.7317 -0.0014 -2.2624
Both have children age 6-12  c612_612 0.0014 6.9827 0.0017 8.1051 0.0020 4.1223
Both have children age 13-17  c1317_1317 0.0008 3.6580 0.0007 2.7617 0.0007 1.2205
Both have children age 18-24 c1824_1824 0.0001 0.4647 0.0001 0.3324 0.0006 0.9957
bmatch* child_m 0.0008 2.4525 0.0000 -0.1228 -0.0008 -0.8606
bmatch* c05_05 0.0024 3.8151 0.0014 1.9184 0.0041 2.3657
bmatch* c612_612 -0.0006 -1.1366 -0.0012 -1.8165 -0.0014 -0.9718
bmatch* c1317_1317 0.0043 6.2145 0.0041 5.4423 0.0043 2.5233
bmatch* c1824_1824 -0.0009 -1.2592 -0.0003 -0.3792 -0.0006 -0.3503
Both age 25-34 a25_25 0.0001 0.8795 0.0002 1.2756 -0.0001 -0.2635
Both age 35-44 a35_35 -0.0003 -2.0681 -0.0003 -2.0085 -0.0003 -0.8766
Both age 45-59 a45_45 0.0006 3.7455 0.0007 3.9735 0.0011 2.5200
Age 25-34 and age 45-59 a25_45 0.0001 0.5039 0.0001 0.8261 -0.0002 -0.6150
Age 35-44 and age 45-59 a35_45 0.0002 1.9667 0.0003 2.2347 0.0005 1.5572
 BASELINE SPECIFICATION 
FULL SAMPLE 
 BOTH IN RESIDENCE AT 
LEAST TWO YEARS 
 BOTH IN RESIDENCE AT 
LEAST TWO YEARS; ONE NOT 
FULLY EMPLOYED LAST 
bmatch (no covariates)bmatch* a25_25 0.0015 4.5860 0.0002 0.5502 -0.0003 -0.2560
bmatch* a35_35 0.0019 4.9150 0.0017 3.8330 0.0021 1.9091
bmatch* a45_45 0.0020 4.5993 0.0013 2.5877 0.0033 2.5547
bmatch* a25_45 0.0005 1.6710 0.0001 0.2269 0.0009 0.8856
bmatch* a35_45 0.0017 5.2775 0.0011 2.9451 0.0017 1.7900
Both single male sm_sm -0.0027 -10.4690 -0.0031 -9.5824 -0.0026 -3.2741
Both single female sf_sf -0.0018 -7.5675 -0.0021 -7.2631 -0.0023 -3.3375
Single male–single female sm_sf -0.0023 -11.3198 -0.0027 -11.1270 -0.0022 -3.8427
Both married male mm_mm -0.0036 -22.2619 -0.0039 -21.5374 -0.0042 -8.5328
Married male–married female mm_mf -0.0030 -19.7063 -0.0032 -19.4269 -0.0034 -9.9138
Single male-married female sm_mf -0.0016 -8.5723 -0.0016 -7.7294 -0.0014 -3.0321
Single male-married male sm_mm -0.0029 -16.5575 -0.0032 -15.6640 -0.0033 -6.5973
Single female-married female sf_mf -0.0014 -7.9850 -0.0015 -7.4660 -0.0020 -4.5427
Single female-married male sf_mm -0.0030 -18.1066 -0.0034 -17.4136 -0.0036 -7.5944
bmatch* sm_sm 0.0037 5.8504 0.0013 1.5955 0.0001 0.0328
bmatch* sf_sf 0.0037 6.3320 -0.0001 -0.0731 -0.0005 -0.2572
bmatch* sm_sf 0.0026 5.1517 -0.0002 -0.3529 -0.0001 -0.0983
bmatch* mm_mm 0.0055 11.6692 0.0008 1.4624 -0.0001 -0.0803
bmatch* mm_mf 0.0039 9.0251 0.0005 0.9820 0.0015 1.4712
bmatch* sm_mf 0.0036 6.9085 0.0001 0.1250 0.0027 1.9925
bmatch* sm_mm 0.0042 8.4997 0.0010 1.6135 0.0022 1.5417
bmatch* sf_mf 0.0042 8.5433 0.0004 0.6222 0.0020 1.5635
bmatch* sf_mm 0.0035 7.3576 -0.0001 -0.2047 0.0008 0.5724
Combined length of residence lngth 0.0000 7.9113 0.0001 5.0917 0.0001 3.1353
Minimum length of residence lngth_min 0.0000 0.5654 0.0000 0.4951 0.0000 -0.0816
Moved within 5 year of each lngth_within 5 0.0002 1.9233 0.0002 1.4490 0.0001 0.3189
bmatch* lngth 0.0000 0.0487 0.0000 -0.4146 -0.0001 -1.1278
bmatch* lngth_min 0.0000 -0.8033 0.0000 0.0262 0.0000 -0.0212
bmatch* lngth_within 5 0.0000 0.0358 0.0000 -0.0614 -0.0012 -1.0885
Block size (population) blocksize 0.0000 1.7315 0.0000 1.5413 0.0000 3.1380
bmatch* blocksize -0.000011 -4.3872 -0.000016 -4.8355 -0.000031 -3.6420
One not fully employed 1 not fully empd 0.0004 3.4467
Two not fully employed 2 not fully empd 0.0021 5.2031
bmatch* 1 not fully empd 0.0008 2.4568
bmatch* 2 not fully empd -0.0027 -2.2752
Sample Size 4032109 2985691 578180TABLE 4
Sorting along Socio-Demographic Attributes
EDUCATION
Block Block Group Tract
hsd hsg clg hsd hsg clg hsd hsg clg
hsd 22 49 28 17 49 35 15 49 37
hsg 9 51 40 9 48 43 9 48 43
clg 5 35 61 6 38 57 6 38 56
AGE
Block Block Group Tract
a25 a35 a45 a25 a35 a45 a25 a35 a45
a25 47 28 25 41 31 28 41 31 29
a35 33 40 27 37 33 30 37 32 31
a45 32 29 39 36 32 33 36 32 32
RACE
Block Block Group Tract
wh bl as-hi wh bl as-hi wh bl as-hi
white 97 2 2 96 2 2 96 2 2
black 40 53 7 46 46 8 49 43 8
asian/hisp 63 13 24 71 15 14 74 15 11
CHILDREN
Block Block Group Tract
c05 c612 c1317 c05 c612 c1317 c05 c612 c1317
c05 40 35 16 22 22 16 21 21 20
c612 34 41 28 22 24 18 21 22 22
c1317 20 37 37 21 23 18 16 17 17
These figures show average exposure rates at each level.  So, for example, the first few entries imply that on average high school dropouts
live in Census Blocks that have 22% high school dropouts, 49% high school graduates, 28% college graduates.
The average ratio of the population of Blocks to Block Groups to Tracts is approximately 1:16:64TABLE 5
Variable Name coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat
Reside in same block 0.0024 14.2000 0.0024 14.6400 0.0023 12.8800
Reside in same block bmatch -0.0086 -2.9619 -0.0113 -3.2414 -0.0025 -0.8697
Both high school drop out hsd_hsd 0.0028 2.5133 0.0022 2.1881 0.0026 2.4808
Both high school graduate hsg_hsg 0.0012 6.4548 0.0015 9.4006 0.0010 5.3463
Both college graduate clg_clg -0.0002 -1.5896 -0.0004 -2.6264 -0.0003 -2.0153
HS drop out - HS grad hsd_hsg 0.0022 6.4198 0.0022 7.6762 0.0021 6.4170
HS drop out – College grad hsd_clg 0.0005 1.6379 0.0005 1.7303 0.0005 1.5683
bmatch* hsd_hsd 0.0014 0.4945 -0.0023 -0.8872 0.0010 0.4032
bmatch* hsg_hsg 0.0024 5.1000 0.0017 3.8140 0.0025 5.2488
bmatch* clg_clg 0.0011 2.8854 0.0017 4.5566 0.0005 1.3158
bmatch* hsd_hsg -0.0003 -0.2950 0.0003 0.4216 0.0012 1.4594
bmatch* hsd_clg -0.0004 -0.5061 -0.0004 -0.5040 -0.0010 -1.1357
Both White wht_wht -0.0007 -0.4516 -0.0043 -2.2872 -0.0021 -1.4041
Both Black bl_bl 0.0044 2.4011 -0.0011 -0.4735 0.0017 0.9167
White – Black bl_wht -0.0010 -0.6842 -0.0047 -2.4660 -0.0020 -1.3154
White – Asian/Hispanic ashi_wht -0.0006 -0.4062 -0.0041 -2.1406 -0.0020 -1.3533
bmatch* wht_wht 0.0046 1.6752 0.0073 2.1632 -0.0035 -1.2910
bmatch* bl_bl 0.0067 2.0650 0.0120 3.0848 -0.0028 -0.8896
bmatch* bl_wht 0.0063 2.2113 0.0066 1.9159 -0.0037 -1.3369
bmatch* ashi_wht 0.0045 1.5645 0.0075 2.1605 -0.0013 -0.4504
Both have children child_m 0.0007 4.0289 0.0008 4.9101 0.0007 3.4862
Both have children age 0-5  c05_05 -0.0005 -1.4413 -0.0002 -0.6817 -0.0009 -2.3239
Both have children age 6-12  c612_612 0.0012 3.6376 0.0015 5.0624 0.0013 3.7994
Both have children age 13-17  c1317_1317 0.0005 1.2507 0.0008 2.3660 -0.0001 -0.2296
Both have children age 18-24 c1824_1824 0.0002 0.4101 0.0001 0.4190 0.0000 0.0262
bmatch* child_m 0.0018 3.5992 0.0015 3.1362 0.0018 3.4121
bmatch* c05_05 0.0043 4.4280 0.0005 0.5227 0.0045 4.3204
bmatch* c612_612 -0.0008 -0.8502 -0.0011 -1.3412 -0.0027 -2.8537
bmatch* c1317_1317 0.0027 2.4545 0.0042 4.0096 0.0074 6.5487
bmatch* c1824_1824 -0.0028 -2.5229 0.0000 0.0192 -0.0012 -1.0619
bmatch (no covariates)
BLOCK GROUPS THAT 
ARE MOST HOMOGENEOUS 
IN TERMS OF CHILDREN
Code
BLOCK GROUPS THAT 
ARE MOST HOMOGENEOUS 
IN TERMS OF RACE
BLOCK GROUPS THAT 
ARE MOST HOMOGENEOUS 
IN TERMS OF EDUCATIONBoth age 25-34 a25_25 -0.0001 -0.2942 0.0001 0.2955 0.0001 0.3133
Both age 35-44 a35_35 -0.0003 -1.3007 -0.0004 -1.9990 -0.0002 -0.6888
Both age 45-59 a45_45 0.0004 1.4017 0.0010 4.1924 0.0008 2.9419
Age 25-34 and age 45-59 a25_45 0.0000 0.0218 0.0000 -0.1062 -0.0002 -1.1746
Age 35-44 and age 45-59 a35_45 0.0004 1.9394 0.0003 1.7628 0.0000 -0.2154
bmatch* a25_25 0.0026 5.2363 0.0009 1.8415 0.0019 3.7101
bmatch* a35_35 0.0018 3.0684 0.0016 2.8119 0.0026 4.1391
bmatch* a45_45 0.0021 3.0963 0.0010 1.4862 0.0018 2.4827
bmatch* a25_45 0.0005 0.9428 0.0002 0.5120 0.0014 2.8431
bmatch* a35_45 0.0016 3.0576 0.0009 1.9121 0.0023 4.2453
Both single male sm_sm -0.0019 -4.4423 -0.0030 -7.4728 -0.0025 -5.7258
Both single female sf_sf -0.0011 -3.0021 -0.0021 -5.9465 -0.0017 -4.3267
Single male–single female sm_sf -0.0019 -5.5979 -0.0028 -8.9740 -0.0023 -6.6765
Both married male mm_mm -0.0032 -12.2071 -0.0041 -16.9492 -0.0035 -12.3050
Married male–married female mm_mf -0.0025 -10.4047 -0.0036 -16.0370 -0.0028 -10.6305
Single male-married female sm_mf -0.0011 -3.6176 -0.0019 -6.8115 -0.0015 -4.7635
Single male-married male sm_mm -0.0022 -7.6939 -0.0033 -12.3466 -0.0026 -8.6094
Single female-married female sf_mf -0.0013 -4.3327 -0.0018 -6.8727 -0.0013 -4.2052
Single female-married male sf_mm -0.0025 -9.0605 -0.0033 -13.0483 -0.0026 -8.8776
bmatch* sm_sm 0.0046 4.7450 0.0048 5.1684 0.0048 4.8270
bmatch* sf_sf 0.0049 5.5184 0.0058 6.6737 0.0052 5.6083
bmatch* sm_sf 0.0034 4.3209 0.0043 5.5928 0.0048 5.8682
bmatch* mm_mm 0.0066 9.0569 0.0076 10.8836 0.0079 10.2533
bmatch* mm_mf 0.0057 8.5538 0.0061 9.5590 0.0051 7.3599
bmatch* sm_mf 0.0055 6.8161 0.0053 6.9682 0.0053 6.3862
bmatch* sm_mm 0.0055 7.1814 0.0069 9.3762 0.0066 8.2167
bmatch* sf_mf 0.0057 7.3866 0.0073 9.8486 0.0060 7.4814
bmatch* sf_mm 0.0040 5.4348 0.0055 7.7416 0.0049 6.3664
Combined length of residence lngth 0.0000 2.5056 0.0000 2.4170 0.0000 1.2296
Minimum length of residence lngth_min 0.0000 0.0582 0.0000 1.6759 0.0000 1.6396
Moved within 5 year of each lngth_within 5 0.0002 0.9488 0.0000 0.1290 -0.0001 -0.2543
bmatch* lngth 0.0000 -0.0662 0.0000 -0.3866 0.0001 1.7889
bmatch* lngth_min 0.0000 -0.2410 0.0000 -0.0485 -0.0001 -1.7232
bmatch* lngth_within 5 -0.0002 -0.3773 -0.0005 -1.0095 0.0009 1.5411
Block size (population) blocksize 0.0000 2.2500 0.0000 1.9565 0.0000 1.0744
bmatch* blocksize -0.000014 -3.7346 -0.000011 -3.0192 -0.000013 -3.4245
Sample Size 1,386,891 1,784,927 1,460,630TABLE 6
Match Quality and Labor Market Outcomes
coef t-stat N coef t-stat N
Labor Force Participation 0.0111 5.754 151572 0.0076 3.284 128797
Employment (Conditional on LFP) -0.0002 -0.173 130231 0.0009 0.566 110433
Employed 0.0088 3.720 151572 0.0045 1.596 128797
Weeks Worked Last Year 0.5897 5.895 151572 0.3642 2.998 128797
Hours Worked Per Week 0.9112 10.511 151572 0.6439 6.149 128797
Log(Earnings) 0.0199 5.132 93053 0.0118 2.453 78200
Log(Wage) 0.0142 3.708 93053 0.0069 1.457 78200
Effect of a one standard deviation increase in match quality
TABLE 7
Match Quality and Labor Market Outcomes: Continued
coef t-stat coef t-stat N coef t-stat N
Labor Force Participation 0.0018 0.917 0.0127 7.349 128797 0.0130 1.522 31778
Employment (Conditional on LFP) -0.0029 -1.792 0.0243 13.715 110433 -0.0009 -0.081 14997
Employed -0.0005 -0.210 0.0084 3.832 128797 0.0052 0.620 31778
Effect of a one standard deviation increase in match quality
Match Quality
Match Quality * Not 
Fully Employed
Both in Residence Two Years; 
One Not Fully Employed
Both in Residence Two Years
Full Sample Both in Residence Two YearsTABLE 8
Match Quality and Labor Market Outcomes: Continued
coef t-stat N coef t-stat N coef t-stat N
Labor Force Participation 0.0100 5.366 151,572     0.0178 8.690 151,572     0.0095 4.474 151,572    
Employment (Conditional on LFP) -0.0003 -0.230 130,231     -0.0010 -0.692 130,231     -0.0017 -1.094 130,231    
Employed 0.0084 3.654 151,572     0.0147 5.853 151,572     0.0051 1.940 151,572    
Weeks Worked Last Year 0.5748 5.906 151,572     0.7872 7.363 151,572     0.4299 3.871 151,572    
Hours Worked Per Week 0.8228 9.754 151,572     1.2200 13.170 151,572     0.8012 8.323 151,572    
Log(Earnings) 0.0232 6.137 93,053       0.0256 5.956 93,053       0.0168 3.868 93,053      
Log(Wage) 0.0174 4.654 93,053       0.0190 4.483 93,053       0.0109 2.556 93,053      
Effect of a one standard deviation increase in match quality
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